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ABSTRACT 
 
Testing an evolutionary framework, this study examined moral self-enhancement 
in relation to self-deception and self-construal in a cross-cultural context.  The 
participants included 127 U.S. and 107 Chinese college students.  The results 
demonstrated that moral self-enhancement is not a characteristic unique to individualistic 
ideology but rather a universal motivation.  Regardless of their cultural groups and self-
construal, participants tended to morally self-enhance, rating their own character and 
sense of responsibility significantly higher than those of other people.  In addition, U.S. 
participants were more likely to morally self-enhance compared to their Chinese 
counterparts.  At the individual level, strong independents demonstrated greater moral 
self-enhancement than did their strong interdependent peers among the U.S. participants, 
whereas greater moral self-enhancement was observed in strong interdependents but not 
strong independent in the Chinese sample.  As hypothesized, self-deception as measured 
by self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) but not impression management (IM) stood out as a 
significant predictor of moral self-enhancement, supporting the evolutionary 
understanding that moral self-enhancement is an unconscious process intimately related 
to self-deception.  Among Chinese participants, the association between moral self-
enhancement and self-deception was found to be mediated through an inflated rating of 
others, which indicated a potential other-enhancement effect.  On the one hand, results of 
this study regarding cultural differences in the demonstration of moral self-enhancement 
were in line with extant self-enhancement literature.  On the other hand, the significant 
relationship between moral self-enhancement and self-deception as revealed in the study 
provided evidence against the claim that culture is the primary explanation for self-
MORAL SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-DECEPTION iv 
enhancement.  Moral self-enhancement as a psychological adaptation to cooperation in 
the social environment has an evolutionary root.  Findings of the study also suggested 
challenges facing current moral education practices.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
The motivation to enhance one’s self-image, which is conventionally labeled as 
self-enhancement, has been among the most actively researched topics in social and 
personality psychology (Alicke & Sedikides, 2010).  Self-enhancement portrays a 
tendency of people to “construe or remember events in a way that places their attributes 
in the most favorable light that is credible to oneself and others” (Alicke & Sedikides, 
2009, p. 2).  Self-evaluation is thus viewed as inherently biased, in a self-serving manner.  
Self-deception, which is sometimes considered an obstacle to self-knowledge, depicts the 
situation in which individuals handle paradoxical information about themselves 
(Greenwald, 1997).  Researchers have affirmed that self-enhancement and self-deception 
permeates in human behavior and both have captured great interest.  While some studies 
appear to suggest self-enhancement is an active demonstration of self-deception, most 
other studies treat the two as unrelated entities.  An interpretation of evolutionary theory 
will shed new light on our understanding of the relationship between them.  Building 
upon past and contemporary research findings on self-enhancement and self-deception, 
the present study serves as an attempt to understand how in nature the two constructs 
correlate with one another and how the relationship is influenced by different cultural 
orientations.   
The moral education of children is a matter of deep concern to everyone from 
parents to society as a whole.  Systematic research on moral development has been going 
on for decades and shedding important light on moral education practices.  While current 
moral education practices have made progress in promoting core values, developing 
intrinsic motivation, and providing opportunities for moral action, a key question lingers: 
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why do people present themselves as more moral than they are?  By considering moral 
self-enhancement, self-deception and the relation between the two within the framework 
of evolutionary psychology, this study calls attention to the challenge facing moral 
education.   
Self-Enhancement 
 
Self-enhancement takes on different forms.  Literature has documented what is 
termed unrealistic optimism – the bias to overestimate one’s chances of experiencing 
positive events and to underestimate one’s risk for experiencing negative events (Hoorens 
& Buunk, 1993; Weinstein, 1980; Weinstein & Klein, 1995); and illusion of control, 
which refers to an expectancy of a personal success probability that is inappropriately 
higher than is objectively warranted (Langer, 1975; Jenkins & Ward, 1965).   
The above-average effect, which is also commonly known as better-than-average 
effect, is considered one of the most pervasive of all self-enhancement phenomena and 
one of the most reliable findings (Alicke & Govorun, 2005).  It is suggested that people 
in general have a proclivity for assessing themselves more favorably than the average 
peer (Freedman, 1978; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).  A similar self-serving pattern has been 
observed in children, too.  For example, in a study of how children make attributions for 
behavior, children in both younger (5-7 years) and older (8-11 years) age groups made 
more internal attributions in explaining negative events if they responded as a 
hypothetical other child, as compared to responding as themselves (Johnston & Lee, 
2005).   
Morality, of particular interest to the present study, is an area in which people are 
usually inclined to exaggerate in comparison with peers.  Research has found the above-
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average effect to be larger on such subjectively construed dimensions as morality than on 
objectively measured dimensions like intellect (Allison, Messick, & Goethals, 1989), as 
morality is more desirable, controllable and less verifiable compared to intelligence, 
which permits greater subjectivity for self-serving biases to occur.  For example, 
researcher have found participants to consistently overestimate the likelihood that they 
would act altruistically and tend to base their self-relevant predictions on the more 
subjective case-based information rather than the more objective, accurate distributional 
information (Epley & Dunning, 2000).  Related research also suggested that people tend 
to underestimate how often others respond generously to request for help (Flynn & Lake, 
2008) and overestimate how much others’ attitudes and actions are driven by selfish 
concerns (Miller, 1999).  Additional evidence from moral hypocrisy research suggested 
that people tend to appear to be moral without actually being moral (Batson & Collins, 
2011; Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997).  For the purpose of 
the present study, self-enhancement, particularly its manifestation in the moral domain, 
will be discussed and examined in terms of a social comparison between moral self-
perceptions and the other-relevant moral-perceptions; moral self-enhancers are 
individuals who perceive themselves more morally competent than they perceive others.     
Self-Deception 
 
Self-deception is described as a puzzling situation in which a person manages to 
convince himself of the negation of a truth so that the person does not reveal any signs of 
deception when the person tries to convince others of the negation of the truth.  
Philosophers consider self-deception a paradoxical condition of knowledge, as they 
question how a knowledge system manages to accommodate an obvious internal 
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contradiction, i.e., the truth and the negation (Mele, 1997).  For clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists, self-deception is employed as a defensive protection from painful 
knowledge, which poses challenges to clinical therapeutic practices (Sackeim & Gur, 
1978; Schafer, 1976).  In the field of psychology, cognitive psychologists attend more 
closely to the underlying mechanism and functionality of self-deception (Paulhus & John, 
1998; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004; Greve & Wentura, 2010).   
Different from their philosopher and mainstream psychologist counterparts, 
evolutionary psychologists view self-deception as a psychological adaptation to the 
environment and a fitness-enhancing strategy (Trivers, 1976).  Evolutionary theory holds 
that it is the “selfish genes” that are responsible for the pre-wiring in all organisms 
(Dawkins, 1976); that is, through natural selection an organism evolves to wire the brain 
so as to strategically maximize its reproductive success.  Deception therefore has evolved 
as a fundamental aspect of human social interaction.  Research has shown that on 
average, people lie twice per day (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), 
with common motives ranging from altruism, impression management, to the pursuit of 
material gain or personal convenience (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998).  
Since deceit can be selectively advantageous, there also exists a strong selection 
for the ability to recognize when deception occurs.  Laboratory findings have testified to 
the fact that acting deceptively can be detected by at least four general categories of cues: 
nervousness, physical indicators of the act of suppression, extra cognitive load in working 
memory, and idiosyncratic signs of nervousness, suppression, and cognitive load (von 
Hippel & Trivers, 2011).  As evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers (1976; 2000) 
famously proposed, self-deception as a result evolves to allow deceivers to circumvent 
5 
 
detection efforts.  By deceiving oneself, a person is able to hide the signs of deception, 
appear to be telling the truth, and therefore deceive others far more effectively.   
Viewing Self-Enhancement and Self-Deception through an Evolutionary Psychology 
Lens 
A survey of self-enhancement literature has shown that self-enhancement is 
biased for good reasons. For example, early studies advocating a cognitive explanation 
emphasize information-processing strategies as a leading cause of self-serving bias.  A 
person may selectively search for positive information that favors the self, attend to 
aspects of the available information preferred to be true, or recall more positive than 
negative information about the self (e.g., Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 
1991; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2008).  For example, in an earlier study it was 
revealed that pleasant events were better recalled than unpleasant events (Skowronski, 
Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991).  Researchers in a more recent study found that 
people recall their own good behavior much better than bad behavior; however, such bias 
in recollection is not applied to their recall of other people’s behavior (D’Argembeau & 
Van der Linden, 2008).  It was suggested that the motivation to bolster people’s self-
image would cause a person to talk to others more frequently about positive events in 
their lives.  While it was not explicitly discussed in these studies, one can reasonably 
argue that self-deception was engaged and played a somewhat important role in the 
formation of self-serving bias.  Whatever the information-processing strategy is, selective 
search for positive over negative information, biased interpretation of attitude-consistent 
or attitude-inconsistent information, or misremembering, self-deception enables people to 
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obscure the true and convince themselves that a falsehood is true (von Hippel & Trivers, 
2011).   
Taking an evolutionary understanding of human nature may provide important 
insights on an understanding of the role self-deception plays in self-enhancement.  
Evolutionary theory suggests the selective advantage of being altruistic and cooperative 
as well as being “selfish”.  As the theory of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) states, the 
helping behavior of an organism may reduce the helper’s fitness temporarily, but in the 
long run the cost of help will pay off with potential returned benefit from the beneficiary.  
By analyzing winning strategies used in evolutionary “games”, such as Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, Axelrod (1984) made interesting discoveries about the nature of cooperation 
and found being nice (i.e., cooperate and never be the first to lie) to be one of the best 
strategies.  In reality, however, succeeding in the game does not have to be costly, i.e., 
being actually altruistic with conscious intention of helping another.  As will be discussed 
in more detail below, it is thus posited that self-enhancement in nature may serve the goal 
of obtaining the benefits of altruism by allowing people to advertise themselves as a 
better cooperator (e.g., being more loyal, more generous, more trustworthy, etc.) than 
they actually are.  And self-deception facilitates self-enhancing motive by enabling a 
person to mask the cues that might reveal deceptive intent. 
Self-Enhancement and Self-Deception in Cultural Contexts 
 
Cultures can be distinguished in several ways, and one of the most commonly 
discussed cultural variability in cross-cultural research is collectivism and individualism 
(Triandis 1995).  Western cultures, such as those of the U.S. and Western Europe, are 
typically labeled as individualistic cultures, given their emphasis on the self and viewing 
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the self as independent of in-groups (Chang, 2008; Greenwald, 1980).  Countries such as 
China, Korea and Japan, are conventionally categorized as collectivist cultures, which 
stress the priority of group goals over individual goals and the importance of harmony 
within social groups.  Cultural difference at the individual level is described in terms of 
two distinct ways in which individuals view themselves in relation to others, namely, 
independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991).  Independent self-construal, which tends to be dominant in individualist cultures, 
defines an individual in terms of autonomy, agency and separation from their social 
contexts.  In contrast, members of collectivist cultures tend to endorse an interdependent 
self-construal, which underscores an individual’s embeddedness in social relationships 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).   
The inquiry into the association between culture and self-enhancement has led to 
a growing number of studies and even protracted debate.  Considering the sharp contrasts 
between the two cultural orientations, both at the cultural level and the individual level, it 
may sound reasonable to suggest that self-enhancement is prevalent only in individualist 
cultures, as self-enhancement is believed to allow members of these cultures to maintain 
and support the independent self (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Heine, 
2003, 2005).  Within collectivist cultures, self-criticism, rather than self-enhancement is 
advocated, as it represents a self-evaluative style by which the interdependent self is 
supported (Heine, Takata, & Lehnman, 2000).  Findings of some studies on the “holier 
than thou” effect further suggested that compared to their individualist peers, collectivists 
are less inclined to overestimate the qualities of themselves and actually make more 
accurate self-predictions of future behavior (Balcetis, Dunning, & Miller, 2008).   
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Some researchers, however, contend that the people in all cultures are motivated 
to maintain a positive self-view (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Greenwald, 1980; Sedikides, 
Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003).  It is only that members of different cultural groups self-
enhance on personally important dimensions, i.e., people with an independent self-
construal view themselves as excelling in individualist attributes, whereas those with an 
interdependent self-construal have an inflated view of their collectivist characteristics 
(Sedikides et al, 2003).  In response to the competing perspectives in existing literature, it 
is expected that findings of the present study will to some extent help sort out the 
controversy.  
Likewise, cross-cultural research also witnessed rivalry views regarding the 
distribution of self-deception in different cultural contexts.  Some suggest that like self-
enhancement, self-deception is also a cultural-specific phenomenon, whereas some others 
argue the ubiquity of this mechanism.  Triandis (2011), for example, stated in his recent 
article that self-deception occurs more frequently in people from simple (e.g., hunters and 
gatherers), tight (many rules of behavior), or vertical (hierarchical) cultures than in those 
from complex (e.g., information societies), loose (few rules), or horizontal (egalitarian) 
cultures, suggesting a link between self-deception and collectivist cultures.  Following 
this logic, one may to some extent assume that people in collectivist cultures (tight and/or 
vertical), such as China, are more likely to deceive themselves than their counterparts in 
individualist cultures (loose and/or horizontal), such as the U.S.  However, some other 
research identified associations between individualism and self-deceptive enhancement as 
well as collectivism and impression management (Lalwani et al, 2006; Lalwani, Shrum, 
& Chiu, 2009).  It’s suggested that individualists tend to display self-deceptive behaviors 
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as individualism’s focus on the self would favor expressions that stress personal 
distinctiveness (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  Collectivists, in contrast, are concerned 
more about social relationship, conformity and face-saving (Johnson & van de Vijver, 
2002) and thus are more closely associated with impression management.  While extant 
self-deception research failed to reach a consensus regarding the link between culture and 
self-deception, taking an evolutionary standpoint that taps into some general 
psychological and behavioral traits shared by all humans may help elucidate the puzzle. 
Significance of the Study 
 
Drawing upon established research and new insights from evolutionary 
psychology, the findings of this study will not only illuminate the nature of self-
enhancing motive by tapping its relation with self-deception but also shed light on the 
controversy over the universality of the self-enhancement phenomenon.  Research on 
self-deception in a cross-cultural context has documented mixed results regarding the 
manifestation of self-deception in difference cultures.  This study seeks to expand the 
literature by investigating the association between self-deception and cultures, targeting 
specifically a U.S. – China comparison.  Despite a wealth of research on self-enhancing 
motives in human behavior and social relations, little consideration has been given to 
how these theories and findings can be used to inform the practice of moral education.  
This study calls attention to the role that moral self-enhancement and self-deception may 
play in moral thinking and behavior and the challenge they pose to moral education.     
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing literature speaks to the bias characteristic of self-enhancement.  What is 
also documented is the debate pertaining to whether the self-serving biases are 
universally prevalent.  Self-deception is routinely considered a construct that is unrelated 
to self-enhancement.  Through a review of theoretical background and related research, 
this chapter presents an alternative way of understanding the nature of self-enhancement, 
self-deception, and the relation between the two. 
Understanding Self-Enhancement 
 
Self-Enhancement in General 
What is of great interest to the present study concerns sentiments similar to those 
expressed in Alexander Pope’s famous quote about human nature: “The greatest 
magnifying glasses in the world are a man’s own eyes when they look upon his own 
person.”  As is evident in the wealth of literature, research across several domains has 
documented the phenomena of self-enhancement – the motivation to “construe or 
remember events in a way that places one’s attributes in the most favorable light that is 
credible to oneself and others” (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009, p. 2).   
As demonstrated by previous research, inflated perception of the self varies along 
several dimensions.  Positive image of the self can be maintained by enhancing the 
positivity of self-concept (self-advancement) or avoiding the negativity of self-concept 
(self-protection) (Arkin, 1981).  Public self-enhancement occurs when a person is 
motivated to preserve, improve, or avoid hurting his or her image in the eyes of others 
(Leary & Kowalski, 1990), whereas private self-enhancement remains unnoticeable 
except to the individuals (Greenwald & Breckler, 1985).  People do not self-enhance in 
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random areas.  Rather, self-enhancement is more likely to take place on qualities or 
attributes that are the most important to a person’s sense of self (Sedikides et al, 2003).  
Moreover, the way people inflate their self-images can be either “candid” or “tactical” 
(Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea, 2005).  Some tend to self-
enhance explicitly on positive aspects of the self-concept, whereas others may elevate the 
positivity in an implicit way. 
Taylor and Brown (1988) in their widely cited work referred to self-enhancement 
in general as the Triad of Positive Illusions, i.e., above-average effect, illusion of control, 
and unrealistic optimism.  Illusion of control refers to people’s overestimation of the 
control they have over outcomes or the future.  In situations where things happen 
randomly, most people are still convinced their actions will influence the results.  
Unrealistic optimism is built on the hope that one has more positive experiences and less 
negative experiences than others (Langer, 1975; Jenkins & Ward, 1965).  Unrealistic 
optimism, also referred to as optimism bias, is built on the hope that one has more 
positive experiences and less negative experiences than others (Weinstein, 1980; 
Weinstein & Klein, 1995).  The above-average effect or the than-average effect, 
describes the tendency to evaluate one’s own characteristics or behaviors more favorably 
than those of an average peer.  In this regard, people tend to view themselves, for 
example, as being happier, having better health prospects, and experiencing higher 
likelihood of positive events compared to the average person (Freedman, 1978; Hoorens 
& Buunk, 1993; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).  This effect is so robust that, even when the 
benchmark on which the self and the average others are judged are identical, the self is 
still perceived more favorably (Alicke & Govorun, 2005).   
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Moral Self-Enhancement 
The scholarly discussion of self-enhancement has also been expanded to the 
moral domain, providing a convincing alternative explanation of the observed disjunction 
of moral standards and moral behaviors.  Research has shown robust findings that most 
people perceive themselves to be above the average in adherence to moral principles 
(Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Epley & Dunning, 2000; Sedikides & Strube, 1997).  The 
reality is, however, people who strongly endorse morality may still engage in behaviors 
that are obviously against the welfare of others and moral principles held dear.  Batson 
and Collins (2011) used the term moral hypocrisy to depict the “motivation to appear 
moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of being moral” (p. 95).  It is argued that more 
is involved in moral failings than just weak moral motivation – the goal of being a moral 
hypocrite is to purse self-interest while still upholding the appearance of morality (Batson 
& Collins, 2011).  And this is exactly where self-enhancement comes into play – a means 
by which “self-interest can be advanced while bamboozling others with one’s alleged 
adherence to exacting moral standards” (Alicke & Sedikides, 2011, p. 9).  For example, 
participants have been consistently observed in a series of moral hypocrisy studies that 
most of them avow the moral standard of fairness while selfishly assigning themselves 
desirable tasks and leaving undesirable ones to another participant (actually fictitious) 
(e.g., Batson & Thompson, 2001; Batson, Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 
1997; Batson, Sampat, & Collins, 2005; Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & 
Strongman, 1999).     
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Self-Deception 
 
The Notion of Self-Deception 
First viewed as a philosophical puzzle, and then discussed as a psychological 
phenomenon, self-deception has captured interest of scholars of several different 
disciplines.  Self-deception was once a concept discussed solely among philosophers 
regarding on its existence, realization, and intentionality (Lu & Chang, 2011).  The 
definition of self-deception suggests the self-deceiver is involved in paradoxes where 
they must 1) hold contradictory beliefs at the same time, and 2) intentionally get 
themselves to believe in the false information (Deweese-Boyd, 2010).  These paradoxes 
have led to skepticism regarding whether it is psychologically or conceptually possible to 
hold contradictory beliefs (Mele, 1997; Paluch, 1967).  Research in the field of clinical 
psychology and psychiatry delineates self-deception as a process that renders individuals 
unaware of the development of their judgments and beliefs (Sackeim & Gur, 1979; 
Paulhus & John, 1998; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004).  For example, in contexts such as 
personality testing, self-deception takes on the form of socially desirable responding 
tendency, which documents the tendency to give “positively biased responses to 
questionnaire items when the responses are not true but the respondent believes they are” 
(Paulhus, 1984).   
Early work on socially desirable responding identified two distinct factors of self-
deception, labeled as Alpha and Gamma (Edwards, Diers, & Walker, 1962; Damarin & 
Messick, 1965; Jackson & Messick, 1962; Wiggins, 1964).  The Alpha factor reflects an 
unconscious attempt to biased self-evaluation, and the Gamma factor represents a 
conscious or intentional attempt to distort one's self-description.  Subsequent research 
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demonstrated a growing consensus regarding the two empirical factors, in which the 
Alpha factor involves the unrealistically positive but honestly held self-descriptions and 
the Gamma factor indicates the deliberately distorted self-image (Sackeim & Gur, 1979; 
Paulhus, 1984, 1991).   
Assuming a related taxonomy provided by Damarin and Messick (1965), Paulhus 
(1991) published the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) and 
distinguished two factors of self-deception: self-deceptive enhancement and impression 
management.  Self-deceptive enhancement describes the unconscious tendency to 
exaggerate positive attributes and conceal negative attributes to the self (Paulhus & John, 
1998).  In contrast, impression management refers to the conscious attempt to distort self-
representations to create a positive public image (Mick, 1996).  BIDR was adopted as one 
of the core measures in the current study, given that it is one of the most commonly used 
measures of self-deception; more importantly, as is discussed in more detail below, it 
allows an examination of the evolutionary benefits of unconscious self-deception and its 
relation to moral self-enhancement. 
Self-Deception as a Fitness-Enhancing Strategy 
Unlike philosophers and mainstream psychologists, evolutionary psychologists 
offer unique insights into the understanding of self-deception as a psychological 
adaptation to the environment and a fitness-enhancing strategy (Trivers, 1976; 2000), 
which renders theoretical support to the hypothesized linkage between self-deception and 
self-enhancement.  As evolutionary theory suggests, human beings’ physiological 
mechanisms have been through the evolutionary process called adaptation to become 
better suited to the environment so as to reproduce copies of genes more successfully.  
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Applying the same thinking to psychology, evolutionary psychologists propose that not 
only did our physical organs develop as functions of natural selection, so did our 
psychological traits.  Moreover, it is suggested that much of human behavior is the 
outputs of evolved psychological adaptations, which natural selection yielded to solve the 
recurrent problems our ancestors faced (Wright, 1994).   
Evolutionary theory predicts the inherent selfishness of human beings.  As 
Richard Dawkins (1976) has stated in The Selfish Gene, “We are survival machines—
robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes … 
This gene selfishness will usually give rise to selfishness in individual behavior” (p. vii).  
As social animals, people gather in groups and obtain the benefits of social life through 
constant reciprocal change and cooperation with others (Trivers, 1991).  Individuals who 
appear to be more cooperative are more likely to be rewarded with returned cooperation 
from fellow humans.  However, some would find ways to obtain the benefits of altruism 
without reciprocating.  Deception as a result evolves as a part of social interaction 
(DePaulo & Kashy, 1998).   
While our selfish genes metaphorically suggest an explanation for the origin of 
self-deception, the law of natural selection also favors the evolution of the ability to 
detect lies.  Those who are not gullible and are more capable of perceiving lies 
demonstrate better fitness and are more likely to send their genes into the next generation.  
Laboratory findings have revealed that deception can be spotted through cues such as 
nervousness, extra cognitive load resulted from manipulating two types of information 
simultaneously and idiosyncratic signs of nervousness, suppression, and cognitive load 
(von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).  Self-deception therefore evolves as an adaptation to 
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facilitate deception of others by allowing a person to mask signs of deception (Trivers, 
1976, 1985).  How does that work?  The distortion of information undergoes a process 
from being conscious to unconscious.  While acting deceptively, both the truth and the 
negation is maintained in consciousness, while only the negation is presented to others.  
Self-deception enables the deceiver to believe his or her own distortions, keeping only 
false information in the consciousness and concealing the truth in the unconsciousness 
(Lu & Chang, 2011).  This way the deceiver will be able to mask signs of deception, 
appear to be telling the truth, and deceive others far more effectively.  As Pinker (2011) 
succinctly puts it, “we lie to ourselves so that we’re more believable when we lie to 
others” (p. 491).  
Linking Self-Deception to Self-Enhancement 
 
A survey of extant literature on self-enhancement and self-deception shows that 
most of the research either views self-enhancement as an active demonstration of self-
deception, or treat the two as unrelated entities, whereas little research has explicitly 
examined how self-deception as a mechanism facilitates people to convince themselves 
that they are better than are objectively warranted.  Nevertheless, extant research did 
reveal signs of involvement of self-deception in the way people bias their information 
processing to “fool” themselves in a self-favorable manner.   
Sedikides and Strube (1997) outlined the many ways that people bias their 
evaluation of themselves versus others, such as processing of self-relevant information, 
causal attributions, social comparison processes, and self-presentation.  As further 
illustration of these points, people can self-deceive via distorted memory and biased 
information processing.  Many studies show that people tend to selectively remember 
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more positive than negative self-relevant attributes (e.g., D’Argembeau & Van der 
Linden, 2008; Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991), seek out selectively for 
information that confirms a positive self-image (Kuiper & MacDonald, 1982; 
Skowronski, Betz, Thompson, & Shannon, 1991), and recollect the past in a self-serving 
manner (Ross, 1989).  Research also indicated that people tend to deceive themselves 
about their own qualities by attributing favorable outcomes to the self and unfavorable 
outcomes to the environment (Greenwald, 1980; Vohs & Schooler, 2007) or regarding 
tasks with which they have had positive experience as more self-relevant than those at 
which they have failed (Hill, Smith, & Lewicki, 1989).  In addition, people can be self-
deceptive in the way they manage their public image, by either releasing positive 
information about the self or blasting the achievements of an enemy (Arkin & 
Baurngardner, 1985; Finch & Cialdini, 1989).  On similar lines, Alicke and Govorun 
(2005) also discussed how better-than-average effect can be achieved through selective 
recruitment.  As the selective recruitment hypothesis suggested, when making 
comparative judgment, people deceptively create a better-than-average image of 
themselves by selecting a comparison target who performs especially poor on the 
judgment dimension (Perfloff & Fetzer, 1986).  Moreover, people have the tendency to 
attend to or weight their own characteristics, beliefs and experiences more heavily than 
information about the comparison group, which then results in greater confidence in 
themselves (Alicke & Govorun, 2005).  
In addition of the above-discussed evidence that associates self-deception to self-
enhancement, adopting an evolutionary psychology perspective can also shed important 
light into our understanding of the relationship between the two.  Evolutionary theory has 
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been helpful in explaining how biological altruism can evolve and persist.  In The 
Descent of Man (1871), for example, Darwin observed that “a tribe including many 
members who … were always ready to give aid to each other and sacrifice themselves for 
the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural 
selection” (p. 166, as cited in Okasha, 2009).  Within the group, an individual who 
behaves altruistically at the expense of his own fitness is clearly at disadvantage 
compared to the other group members; the fitness of the group as a whole however will 
be enhanced as a result of altruism (Okasha, 2009).  The concept of “reciprocal altruism”, 
introduced and developed by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers (1971), also stresses 
the evolution of cooperation as instances of mutually altruistic behavior, but among 
unrelated organisms.  The fundamental idea of reciprocal altruism is that an organism 
may temporarily reduce its fitness to help another with the expectation of the favor being 
returned at a later time.  The cost of helping therefore might be offset by the likelihood of 
returned benefit, allowing the relationship to evolve.   
To understand self-enhancement in light of evolutionary theory, the tendency to 
bolster one’s self-image entails great evolutionary benefits.  As evolutionary theory 
suggests, altruistic behavior, such as cooperation, is essentially a strategy of increasing 
one’s own reproductive fitness.  Applying this logic to the current argument, advertising 
the self as a better cooperator than the average (e.g., being more loyal, more generous, 
more trustworthy) is actually driven by the motive to obtain the advantage of returned 
benefits from others.  And the key to convincing people of the exaggerated self-image is 
to sincerely believe it (Pinker, 2011; Trivers, 1991; Wright, 1994).  In other words, 
people must first believe what they exaggerate about and incorporate the false 
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information into self-evolution before they can confidently convey the distorted image to 
others, i.e., to self-deceive.   
In addition to its role in facilitating interpersonal deception, self-deception also 
allows people to display more confidence than they actually have (von Hippel & Trivers, 
2011).  The more confident the self-image is presented, the more likely the individuals 
are to be viewed by others as leaders (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993) and are believed 
to have stronger social influence than those who lack in confidence (Zarnoth & Sniezek, 
1997).  Thus, self-deception serves as an important strategy that people can “bolster their 
image of themselves to themselves and enhance their self-confidence” and “thereby 
increase the chances that they will be able to influence others and will be chosen for 
socially important roles” (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011, p. 5).   
Taking the similar evolutionary standpoint, Lu and Chang (2011) found self-
deception to be positively associated with moral self-concept in a recent study.  It was 
suggested that high moral self-concept tends to result in more conscious blocking of 
selfish attitudes exercised via self-deception.  When there is little conscious curbing due 
to low moral self-concept, which makes self-deception unnecessary, selfishness is likely 
to be pursued consciously (Lu & Chang, 2011).  Moreover, self-consciousness was found 
to regulate the way self-deception is exercised.  For individuals with high self-
consciousness, who are more aware of the self, they are more alert when a conflict 
between the pursuit of selfish interest and the maintenance of altruistic self-image takes 
place and thus experience higher levels of self-deception to help conceal selfish interests.   
Research on moral hypocrisy has supported the view of self-enhancement as a 
means to purse selfish interests by demonstrating how people avow the moral standard of 
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fairness by behaving selfishly (e.g., Batson et al, 1997; Batson et al, 2005; Batson et al, 
1999).  For example, in an early study by Batson and colleagues (1997), research 
participants were asked to assign themselves and a fellow participant (fictitious one) to 
either a positive-consequence task (comes with a chance of earning a raffle ticket) or a 
neutral-consequence task (comes without any benefits).  Not surprisingly, most research 
participants, 16 out of 20, assigned themselves to the desirable task, even though very 
few of them, 1 out of 10, perceived that it is the most morally right decision to assign the 
desirable task to the self (Batson & Thompson, 2002).  In subsequent studies that aimed 
to investigate the nature of moral motivation, participants were allowed to assign tasks by 
flipping a coin in private, which seemed to be the fairest method but allowed them to not 
actually abide by the flip outcome (Batson et al., 1997; Batson & Thompson, 2001).  It 
turned out that about half chose not to flip the coin, of which 90% assigned themselves to 
the desirable task.  And for those who did choose to flip the coin the findings were much 
the same – 90% assigned themselves to the positive-consequence task, which was a 
significantly higher percentage than the expected 50% for a fair coin flip (Batson & 
Thompson, 2002).   
Examining Self-Enhancement and Self-Deception in Cultural Contexts 
 
Defining Cultural Differences 
As a culture-dependent perspective would suggest, an individual’s psychological 
system is shaped by its cultural system through societal institutions and enculturation 
practices (Sedikides et al, 2003; Sedikides et al, 2005).  Different cultural systems have 
their unique definitions of socially desirable members (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 
1997).  Extant literature has commonly distinguished one cultural system from another in 
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terms of individualism and collectivism.  Western cultures are typically labeled as 
individualistic cultures, given their emphasis on the self and viewing the self as 
independent of in-groups (Chang, 2008; Greenwald, 1980).  For members of individualist 
cultures, the attainment of independence, agency, freedom from societal constraints, and 
personal success are highly regarded and sought after (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, 
& Tipton, 1985; Spindler & Spindler, 1990).  Eastern cultures are usually viewed as 
collectivistic, given their focus on the priority of group goals over individual goals and 
the importance of harmony within social groups.  Thus, cooperation, inter-personal 
harmony, attending to significant others, and responsibility to the group are strongly 
expected from members of collectivist cultures (Bond, Leung, & Wan, 1982; De Vos, 
1985).    
It is suggested that members of individualist cultures and members of collectivist 
cultures differ distinctly in the way they conceptualize the self in terms of its relation to 
the social contexts (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a).  In particular, Western cultures tend to 
construe the self as an autonomous and unique individual and as separate from their 
social context – a representation called independent self-construal.  People in Western 
cultures typically obtain positive self-regard from the “ability to express self, validate 
internal attributes” (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b, p. 230, Table 1).  Eastern cultures, in 
contrast, depict the self as fundamentally embedded within a larger social network – 
called an interdependent self-construal.  The positive views of the self are often attained 
from the “ability to adjust, restrain self, and maintain harmony with social context” 
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991b, p. 230, Table 1).    
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These divergent cultural orientations have also been demonstrated in the distinct 
cognitive processes individuals adopted.  Nisbett and colleagues (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & 
Norenzayan, 2001) contended that East Asians and Westerners employ different 
cognitive processes, namely, holistic versus analytic cognition.  People in East Asian 
cultures which emphasize the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other, are 
more inclined to view the focal object and its context as a whole with attention being paid 
to the part-whole relations and continuity – a holistic approach.  In contrast, people in 
Western cultures, who view themselves as independent, self-contained, and autonomous 
individuals, tend to detach the object from its context, focusing on the unique attributes of 
the object – an analytic approach (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001).  Nisbett et 
al. (2001) speculated that the origin of these differences is traceable to markedly different 
social organizations.  For example, a complex and interdependent social network 
represented by most Asian cultures requires people to attend to relationships and context.  
Therefore, the sense of attachment to the environment and groups makes people within 
such cultures more attentive to attributes that are relationship-laden and environment-
relevant, and self-enhance on these attributes.   
Is the Motivation to Self-Enhance Universal?   
As suggested by the research reviewed above, the interplay of cultural practices 
and cognitive processes may contribute to distinct psychological bases for self-evaluation 
motivations.  Self-enhancement represents the motivation to influence thinking and 
behavior towards the direction of protecting, maintaining, or elevating the positivity of 
the self (Sedikides et al, 2003).  Thus from the culture-dependent perspective, self-
enhancement should be prevalent in people with independent self-construal, who are 
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commonly seen in individualist cultures (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; 
Heine, 2003, 2005).  In contrast, for individuals with interdependent self-construal, who 
are usually fostered in collectivist cultures, they are motivated to fit in, retrain self, and 
maintain group harmony; self-criticism, rather than self-enhancement, constitutes a 
motivating factor for them (Heine et al, 1999; Heine, 2003, 2005).  The debate over 
whether self-enhancement motivation is culture-dependent or universal will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
In recent years, self-enhancement researchers have become increasingly interested 
in whether self-enhancement is only characteristic of relatively individualistic 
worldviews or whether it extends to collectivistic worldviews as well (Balcetis et al, 
2008; Heine et al, 1999; Sedikides et al, 2003).  In a review paper on positive self-regard, 
Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) first proposed that the need for positive 
self-regard is culturally dependent.  Reporting the results from a number of cross-cultural 
studies, especially with North American (US and Canadian) and Japanese samples, Heine 
et al (1999) posited that the need for positive self-regard may not exist in Japan, as it does 
in North America.  One reason they provided is that Japanese, influenced by their culture 
that values group membership and duty over individual rights, are motivated not to stand 
out of a group.  Accordingly, self-enhancement, which highlights the positivity of 
oneself, is not found in Japanese culture.  Furthermore, Heine (2003a; 2003b; 2005) 
advanced that Japanese are not motivated to self-enhance; rather, they are motivated to be 
concerned for what other people think about them.  Specifically, it is argued that 
underlying the common motivation for both North Americans and Japanese is the motive 
to be a good cultural member, rather than to self-enhance.  In contrast to North 
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Americans who satisfy the motivation through self-enhancement, Japanese satisfy this 
motivation through face maintenance, that is, being concerned about what others think of 
them, (Heine, 2005).   
Heine and colleagues’ conclusion sparked studies that have provided empirical 
evidence supporting the assumption of universal self-enhancement.  Sedikides and 
colleagues (2003) challenged the claim that the need for self-regard is culture-dependent 
and affirmed otherwise the universality of such need.  As shown in substantial lines of 
research, positive self-regard serves to buffer against emotional and behavioral problems 
(Anderson, 1999; Kurman & Sriram, 1997; Leary, 1999, as cited in Sedikides et al, 
2003), reduce feelings of existential terror (Greenberg, 2008; Greenberg, Solomon, & 
Pyszczynski, 1997, ), and correlate with optimism, resiliency, and coping with adversity 
(Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Taylor & Armor, 1996, as cited in 
Sedikides et al, 2003).  Given its wide-ranging effects on human cognition, emotion, and 
behavior, it is reasonable to predict that self-enhancement, which serves as the cognitive 
or behavioral manifestations of the need for positive self-regard, should be a universal 
desire as well.   
Existing evidence has suggested that regardless of cultural backgrounds, people 
strategically self-enhance on personally important dimensions, i.e., Westerners self-
enhance on individualistic attributes, whereas Easterners self-enhance on collectivistic 
attributes (Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Sedikides et al, 2003).  Sedikides and colleagues’ 
subsequent study (Sedikides et al, 2005) replicated their previous findings, showing that 
collectivists demonstrate self-serving biases when traits valued in collectivist cultures, 
such as cooperativeness and loyalty are assessed.  In addition, as with members of 
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individualist cultures, the more that members of collectivist culture value a trait, the more 
they view themselves as superior to others on that trait.  The present study adopts an 
orientation consistent with the universalist viewpoint.  Informed by evolutionary theory 
and thinking, this study further explores the nature of self-enhancement by tapping its 
relationship with the innate tendency to engage in self-deception.  This study thus 
provides an alternative interpretation of the prevalence of self-enhancing motive and calls 
attention into the role the distortions and biases may play in our moral thinking and 
behavior. 
Self-Deception in Cultural Contexts 
Cross-cultural researchers have for long been fascinated by the question “who are 
more likely to present themselves honestly – collectivists or individualists?”  Extant 
research has provided mixed answers.  Some have linked collectivism with deception, 
lying, and face-saving behavior (Lewis & George, 2008; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, 2001’ 
Triandis & Suh, 2002, as cited in Lalwani et al, 2006).  In comparison, individualism has 
been associated with sincerity, authenticity, and honesty (Trilling, 1972; van Hemert, van 
de Vijver, Poortinga, & Georgas, 2002, as cited in Lalwani et al, 2006).  For example, in 
a study of culture’s role in people’s deceptive behavior, Lewis and George (2008) found 
Korean respondents, who exhibited greater collectivistic values, to be more apt to employ 
deception compared to American respondents.  Additional findings from the study also 
showed that whereas American respondents tended to lie about where they lived, their 
age, and interests, Korean respondents were apt to lie about their job, salary, and physical 
appearance.  Similarly, Triandis and Suh (2002) indicated that lying is considered more 
acceptable in collectivistic than in individualistic cultures when it comes to saving face or 
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helping in-groups.  Triandis (2011) posited that self-deception occurs more frequently in 
people from simple (e.g., hunters and gatherers), tight (many rules of behavior), or 
vertical (hierarchical) cultures than in those from complex (e.g., information societies), 
loose (few rules), or horizontal (egalitarian) cultures.   
However, some research instead suggests that like self-enhancement, self-
deception is also a universal phenomenon with cultural variations in its demonstration.  In 
their study exploring the role culture plays in desirable responding styles, Lalwani and 
colleagues (2006) identified links between socially desirable responding and different 
categories of cultural orientation.  Specifically, they found self-deceptive enhancement to 
be positively associated with horizontal individualism and impression management be 
positively related to horizontal collectivism.  These findings suggested that people 
regardless of cultural backgrounds would engage in self-deception to serve their 
culturally relevant goals.  In a more recent study researchers (Cai, Sedikides, Gaertner, 
Wang, Carvallo, Xu, O’mara, & Jackson, 2011) showed evidence that lent support to the 
hypothesis of tactical self-enhancement in China.  It was found that when high on 
dispositional modesty or situationally prompted to behave modestly, Chinese participants 
manifested low explicit enhancement of self-image but also concurrently viewed their 
modest behaviors as evidence of positively valued self which lead to increased implicit 
self-esteem.   
Admittedly, many research efforts have been devoted to uncovering the links 
between self-enhancement and its cultural correlates, most of them targeting a U.S. – 
Japan comparison.  We lack studies that investigate self-enhancing perceptions in 
Chinese culture and a focus specifically on an U.S. – China comparison.  The same is 
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true for self-deception research.  China has been conventionally categorized into the tight 
and vertical type of collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1995).  Three decades ago when the 
country decided to take a more individualist road towards its future and the government 
slowly began to reduce its grip on social and collectivist processes, new economies, 
policies and mass media have aided China in creating a society in which collectivism and 
individualism appear to co-exist as leading social values.  The younger generations of 
Chinese seem to have identified themselves with some Western values, such as 
individualism.  Considering the individualist-collectivist dichotomy in modern Chinese 
society, it would be interesting and at the same time necessary to reexamine the position 
of young Chinese on the dimensions of cultural variation; more importantly, how their 
relative identification with cultural orientations might influence the way they perceive 
themselves compared to their counterparts in the U.S. 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The primary purpose of this study is to test the hypothesized correlation between 
self-enhancement and self-deception as functions of self-construal in a cross-cultural 
context.  Specifically, this study endeavors to: 1) find out if as the universalist viewpoint 
suggests, moral self-enhancement exists within both cultural groups or it is a culture-
specific motivation; 2) investigate the relationships between moral self-enhancement and 
self-deception within U.S. and Chinese samples respectively; and 3) examine how self-
construal influences moral self-enhancement and self-deception.  
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
Hypothesis 1 is developed to test the universality of moral self-enhancement. 
Many researchers posited that self-enhancement, which is driven by the quest for positive 
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self-regard, is a universal human motive (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Greenwald, 1980; 
Sedikides et al, 2003). Evolutionary thinking would argue that self-enhancement is a 
universal motivation that evolves as a psychological adaptation to the social environment 
(Trivers, 1976; 1985). Based on the evidence above, the following hypothesis is 
developed. 
H1: Moral self-enhancement exists independent of participants’ cultural 
background or self-construal. Specifically, (a) across two cultural groups, individuals 
would rate their own moral attributes (e.g., character, sense of responsibility) more 
favorably than those of others, and (b) regardless of the type of self-construal that 
individuals primarily identified themselves with (independent self-construal vs. 
interdependent self-construal), participants would self-enhance by rating their own moral 
attributes significantly higher than those of others. 
Hypothesis 2 is developed to investigate the influence of self-deception on moral 
self-enhancement.  Evolutionary theory explains how altruism and cooperation can 
extend beyond kin (Trivers, 1971). Accordingly, people who advertise the self as a better 
cooperator are more likely to be rewarded with altruism and cooperation. Self-deception 
allows people to believe their inflated self-image so that they could convince others of the 
distortion more effectively. Previous research on moral hypocrisy has demonstrated how 
people may obtain the social and self rewards of being seen and seeing oneself as moral 
while, if possible, reaping the material rewards of acting selfishly (Batson, 2011; Batson 
& Collins, 2011; Batson & Thompson, 2001).  Based on this analysis, the following 
hypothesis was established. 
H2: Self-deception significantly predicts moral self-enhancement. 
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Hypothesis 3 is developed to examine the influence of self-construal on moral 
self-deception. Hypothesis 4 tests the influence of self-construal on self-deception. 
Previous work has recognized that collectivism and individualism are dichotomous when 
compared across cultures but can be orthogonal to each other at the individual level 
(Gelfand, Triandis, & Chan, 1996; Hofstede, 1980). Thus, measuring self-construal 
within a single culture and comparing between independent and interdependent 
individuals will provide direct evidence on how cultural differences at individual level 
affect the extent to which people self-enhance and self-deceive. 
H3: Across two cultural groups, moral self-enhancement is greater among 
individuals with independent self-construal than those with interdependent self-construal. 
H4: Across two cultural groups, self-deception is stronger among independents 
than interdependents. 
Hypothesis 5 is developed to examine the big picture of how self-deception and 
self-construal together influence individuals’ moral self-enhancement. 
H5: Across two samples, both self-deception and self-construal significantly 
predict moral self-enhancement. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter provides a description of the research methodology.  Included is a 
description of the data collection procedure, instrumentation, and data analysis technique 
employed to test the hypotheses.   
Sample 
 
Data were collected from convenience samples of college students enrolled at a 
mid-west university in the U.S. and college students enrolled at a university in a 
geographically similar location of Central China.  The two universities are about the same 
size in terms of student population and both located in relatively large cities.  Previous 
research has suggested that individuals from the U.S. are highly independent and 
individuals from China are highly interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991).  As many 
have also recognized, seemingly dichotomous cultural scripts can actually lie side by side 
at the individual level; one or the other may become more salient in certain domain or 
contexts (Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2001; Dorner, Orellana, & Jimenez, 2008).  Using a 
self-report measure, the general cultural orientations of participants in the U.S. and 
Chinese samples were examined for the purpose of the study.   
Procedures 
 
Instructors of undergraduate courses in the Department of Economics and 
Management and College of Education in the two universities were contacted and asked 
for permission to recruit research participants from their classes.  Once permissions were 
given by the instructors, a date and time were arranged to introduce the research project 
and invite individuals to volunteer in the study.  The researcher distributed consent forms 
and questionnaires, and asked students to read the consent forms.  It was stated clearly in 
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the consent forms that there would be no penalty for declining to participate in the study.  
Students who consented to participate in the study signed on the form and continued to 
complete a battery of questionnaires.  The time required for filling out the paper-and-
pencil questionnaires was approximately 40 minutes.   
Measures 
 
Moral Self-Enhancement Scale (MSES).  The 14-item MSES was developed by 
the researcher and colleagues and used in the current study to measure moral self-
enhancement.   
The social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) suggests that people have the 
natural tendency to evaluate their own opinions and abilities; when reference to objective 
criteria is not available, people would compare their opinions and abilities with those of 
others.  Previous research implied the involvement of a social comparison process in self-
enhancement and focused on the extent to which individuals believe they compare 
favorably relative to others.  In Brown’s study (1986), for example, self-enhancement 
bias in social cognition was manifested by the difference between college students’ rating 
on positive attributes of themselves and their ratings on the same traits of people in 
general.  Other researchers (Brown & Kobayashi, 2002; Kobayashi & Greenwald, 2003) 
also adopted the social comparison methodology in their self-enhancement studies, using 
general others as a reference point of social comparison.  The MSES thus operationalized 
moral self-enhancement as the discrepancy between an individual’s self-perception and 
his/her perception of others.   
The original MSES was a 30-item questionnaire, consisting of 15 self-regard 
items and 15 other-regard items presented in random order.  The self-regard items asked 
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participants to rate the degree to which they believe themselves to possess traits such as 
stable character and sense of responsibility.  An example of the items was “I will take 
responsibility for what I do even in difficult situations.”  The other-regard items were 
identical to self-regard items except that the subject “I” was replaced with “Other 
people”.  Hence: “Other people will take responsibility for what they do even in difficult 
situations.”  Ratings were given based on a Likert scale in which 1 meant “strongly 
disagree” and 5 meant “strongly agree”.  The moral self-enhancement effect was 
measured by the difference in means of respondents’ own ratings and his/her ratings of 
others, with larger self-other discrepancy indicating greater moral self-enhancement. 
The original MSES was first translated into Chinese following the procedure 
outlined by Brislin (1986).  The two versions of MSES were then tested in a pilot study 
with 93 U.S. students and 101 Chinese students, who were recruited following the same 
procedure from the same two student populations as in the current study.  The refinement 
process of the MSES included item-total correlation analysis, factor analysis and 
reliability analysis.  Items with low item-total correlations were first removed, and factor 
analyses using principal factoring and promax rotation (Gorsuch, 1983) were then 
performed to explore the underlying factor structures and further eliminate items.  Results 
of factor analyses supported a two-factor structure for both the self-regard subscale and 
the other-regard subscale.  After items with low factor loadings (less than 0.40) or 
double-loading items with secondary loadings of 0.30 or greater were removed, the 
MSES was trimmed down to a 14-item version, including 7 self-regard items and 7 other-
regard items.  Following the same procedure, the number of items in the Chinese version 
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was also reduced to 14.  The 14-item MSES was viewed as the final version and used in 
the current study.   
The Self-Construal Scale (SCS).  The Self-Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994), a 
two-factor 24-item self-report measure, was used to assess the strength of an individual’s 
independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal.  Respondents indicated 
their agreement with each of the items on a Likert Scale where 1 meant “strongly 
disagree” and 7 meant “strongly agree”.  A sample independent self-construal item was “I 
enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects.”  A sample interdependent 
self-construal item was “It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group.”  
Mean ratings of each subscale were derived to give participants an independent self score 
and an interdependent self score; high mean scores indicated high levels of independent 
self-construal and interdependent self-construal.  This scale was reported to have 
adequate reliability for the independent self-construal subscale (α = .70) and 
interdependent self-construal subscale (α = .73) respectively (Singelis & Sharkey, 1995), 
as well as content validity and construct validity (Singelis, 1994).  The method used by 
Balcetis and colleagues (2008) was adopted to determine participants’ general cultural 
tendencies.  Those whose independent scores were higher than interdependent scores 
were assigned to the independent group.  Those whose interdependent scores were 
greater than independent scores were assigned to interdependent group.  Participants 
whose general self-construal type cannot be defined (all are high on both independent and 
interdependent) would be dropped from analyses.   
The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR, version 6).  The 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) was a 40-item instrument 
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developed to assess the degree to which self-reports are distorted (Paulhus, 1991).  The 
two subscales of BIDR were supposed to capture two major social desirable responding 
dimensions, i.e., Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) and Impression Management (IM).  
Each subscale consisted of 20 items.  Participants were asked to indicate how truly each 
statement describes them using a Likert scale ranging from 1“not true” to7 “very true”.  
The SDE subscale included items such as “I have not always been honest with myself”, 
with high scores on the scale reflecting a tendency towards an unconscious promotion of 
self-image.  The IM subscale included items such as “I rarely appreciate criticism”, with 
high ratings on the scale indicating a conscious desire to maintain a favorable impression.  
As for scoring, after revising negatively termed items, only extreme response (6 or 7) was 
given one point.  Thus, total points for each subscale were likely to range from 0 to 20.  
Values of coefficient alpha were reported to range from .68 to .80 for the SDE subscale 
and from .75 to .86 for the IM subscale (Paulhus, 1991).  Consistently, a reliability 
generalization analysis reported that across samples the BIDR produced adequately 
reliable scores, with the mean reliability coefficient of the IM subscale being .74, .68 for 
the SDE subscale and .80 for the overall BIDR scale (Li & Bagger, 2007). 
All three of the instruments were originally developed in English.  To administer 
to the Chinese sample, the English version of the instruments was translated to Chinese 
following the translation and back-translation steps of Brislin’s model (1986).  The 
MSES was the first scale for the subjects to complete, followed by the SCS and the 
BIDR.  The scales used for exploratory purposes were put at the end to avoid possible 
influence on responses to the other surveys.  The whole survey packet included the three 
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instruments described above and basic demographic information questions including age, 
gender, ethnicity, and education level.   
Statistical Analysis 
 
 The characteristics of demographic information were reported using descriptive 
statistics.  Reliabilities of all measures were tested to determine if individuals respond 
consistently across items.  A Cronbach’s alpha reliability estimate of 0.6 or higher was 
adopted to determine acceptable level of internal consistency.   
Paired sample t tests were performed to capture significant difference(s) between 
mean ratings of self and mean ratings of others for participants across two cultural groups 
and for participants of different self-construals. 
Multiple linear regression analyses were conducted to model the relationships 
between self-enhancement, self-deception, and self-construal.  The model summary and 
the regression coefficients were interpreted to determine any statistical significance 
among the variables.  
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was performed to test for 
differences in individuals’ moral self-enhancement and self-deception between 
individuals with different self-construals.  If the MANOVA analyses showed significant 
differences, then Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was checked to investigate the 
differences.   
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents results of data analyses and consists of three sections.  The 
first section provides a description of participant characteristics.  This section is followed 
by a presentation of the results of data analyses.  Hypotheses testing are presented in the 
last section.  
Sample Characteristics 
 
Participants were undergraduates recruited from a U.S. university (n=156) located 
in a Mid-western state and a Chinese university (n=107) located in Central region of 
China.  The U.S. participants’ ages ranged from 20 to over 49, among which 81.4% aged 
20 through 29 (n=127).  Given the fact that all Chinese participants fell into the age group 
of 20-29, the current study focused solely on participants within this age group, which 
resulted in a total 127 U.S. participants (95 females and 32 males) and a total of 107 
Chinese participants (54 females and 53 males).   
The majority of U.S. participants were White or Caucasian (n=103, 81.1%), 
followed by 13.4% Black or African American (n=17), 3.9% Hispanic (n=5) and 1.6% 
Asian (n=2).  The U.S. participants were primarily education majors (92.1%).  The 
Chinese participant’s academic backgrounds included economics (39.3%) and business 
administration (60.7%).  Details of participant characteristics were provided in Table 1.  
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Table 1  
 
Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
 
Characteristics  U.S. (n=127) China (n=107) 
 Frequency Percentage 
 
Frequency Percentage 
 
Ethnic group White or 
Caucasian 
103 81.1 - - 
 Black or African 
American 
17 13.4 - - 
 Hispanic 5 3.9 - - 
 Asian  2 1.6 107 100 
 American Indian 
or Alaskan Native 
- - - - 
 Other - - - - 
      
Gender Female 95 74.8 54 50.5 
 Male 32 25.2 53 49.5 
      
Age 20-29 127 100 107 100 
      
Major Education 117 92.1 - - 
 Economics - - 42 39.3 
 Business 
administration 
10 7.9 65 60.7 
 
Data Analyses 
 
Data Screening 
The dataset under analysis consisted of 234 cases, including 127 U.S. participants 
and 107 Chinese participants.  SPSS Descriptives was used to obtain means, standard 
deviations, minimum, maximum and check for out of range values for demographic 
questions (e.g., gender, level of education, ethnicity, etc.) and for each item of the three 
instruments.    
Reliabilities of Measures 
 The reliabilities of all measures were obtained using Cronbach’s alpha.  The test 
of reliability showed that the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of each sub-scale of Moral 
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Self-Enhancement Scale (MSES), Self-Construal Scale (SCS), and Balanced Inventory of 
Desirable Responding (BIDR, 6
th
 version) were in an acceptable range (Table 2).  It is 
noted that the original BIDR consisted of 40 items, with 20 items on each of its two 
subscales.  However, since statements “I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed 
limit,” and “I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit” do not apply to general 
Chinese participants, for whom it is not common to have their own car and drive to 
school, these two items were dropped, leaving 19 items on each subscale for subsequent 
analyses.  Overall, the reliability estimates for the self- and other- subscales of the MSES 
was .68 and .77 respectively.  The reliability estimates for the two subscales of the SCS, 
namely, independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal also reported good 
overall internal consistency (α = .77 and α = .69).  BIDR in the current sample 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency, with reliability estimates being .63 and .60 
for self-deceptive enhancement and impression management respectively.  Group means 
and standard deviations of measures can be found in table 3. 
Table 2  
 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliabilities 
 
Measures 
Number of 
items 
U.S. China Overall 
MESE 14    
Rating of self 7 .70 .67 .68 
Rating of others 7 .71 .64 .77 
SCS 24    
Independent self-construal 12 .61 .76 .77 
Interdependent self-construal 12 .69 .75 .69 
BIDR (6
th 
version) 38    
Self-deceptive enhancement 19 .64 .68 .63 
Impression management 19 .66 .53 .60 
39 
 
Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Moral Self-Enhancement, Self-Construal, and Self-Deception by 
Cultural Group 
 
Measures  U.S. China 
 Range M SD M SD 
Moral self-enhancement  1.21
***
 0.64 0.22 0.48 
Rating of self 1-5 3.68
*
 0.54 3.50 0.54 
Rating of others 1-5 2.47 0.51 3.28
***
 0.52 
Independent self-construal 1-7 5.04
***
 0.64 3.89 0.67 
Interdependent self-construal 1-7 4.85 0.69 4.69 0.79 
Self-deceptive enhancement 1-7 5.32 3.02 5.92 3.09 
Impression management 1-7 5.56
***
 3.04 4.39 2.54 
Note. 
*
p<.05.  
***
 p<.001.   
 
Correlations between Measures   
Correlations between measures for U.S. sample are as showed in the top panel of 
Table 4.  Over the entire sample, MSE was positively associated with IND (r=.38, p<.01) 
but not INTER.  In addition, MSE was found to be positively related to both SDE (r=.48, 
p<.01) and IM (r=.18, p<.05).  This suggests that people with propensity to self-deceive, 
regardless of the form it takes, are likely to engage in moral self-enhancement.  While 
both self-deception measures were significantly correlated with MSE, the link was much 
stronger with SDE than with IM.  SDE was found to be positively correlated with 
independent self-construal, whereas IM was positively correlated with interdependent 
self-construal.  Both SDE and IM showed significant positive relationship with rating of 
self.   
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As shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, the correlation matrix for Chinese 
sample did not reveal any significant relationships between MSE and self-construal or 
between MSE and self-deception.  It may sound quite surprising at first.  However, if we 
recall that MSE is operationalized as the discrepancy between self-evaluated morality and 
one’s evaluation of other people, the absence of significant relationships is still 
interpretable mathematically.  That is, if both rating of self and rating of others are 
positively related to, for example, self-deception, it then suggests that individuals who 
experience higher levels of self-deception would rate higher on both their own morality 
and other people’s morality, whereas those who experience less self-deception would rate 
both their own morality and that of others less favorably; however, the difference 
between the rating of self and rating of others represented by MSE may remain constant, 
which explains why MSE is not correlated with levels of self-deception.  A closer 
examination of the results in Table 3 confirmed the above described assumption.  Results 
showed that both rating of self and rating of others were associated with self-construal 
(IND and INTER) in the positive direction; both ratings were also positively associated 
with self-deception (SDE and IM).  Interpretation of these correlations will be discussed 
in detail in the following chapter.   
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Table 4 
 
Correlations among Measures of Moral Self-Enhancement, Self-Construal and Self-
Deception by Cultural Group 
 
 MSE Self Others IND INTER SDE IM 
 U.S. (n=127) 
MSE -       
Self .64
**
 -      
Others -.58
**
 .25
**
 -     
IND .38
**
 .38
**
 -.07 -    
INTER .01 .11 .10 .15 -   
SDE .48
**
 .46
**
 -.11 .28
**
 -.02 -  
IM .18
*
 .30
**
 .10 .07 .19
*
 .51
**
 - 
 China (n=107) 
MSE -       
Self .49
**
 -      
Others -.41
**
 .60
**
 -     
IND -.03 .44
**
 .49
**
 -    
INTER .13 .46
**
 .36
**
 .71
**
 -   
SDE .04 .41
**
 .39
**
 .32
**
 .50
**
 -  
IM .09 .33
**
 .26
**
 .21
*
 .28
**
 .59
**
 - 
Note.  MSE= Moral Self-Enhancement; Self= rating of self; Others= rating of others; 
IND= independent self-construal; INTER= interdependent self-construal; SDE= self-
deceptive enhancement; IM= impression management. 
*
p<.05. 
**
p<.01.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1(a) stated that across two cultural groups (U.S. and China) 
participants would demonstrate moral self-enhancement, i.e., participants would evaluate 
their own moral attributes (e.g., character, sense of responsibility) more favorably than 
those of others.  Hypothesis 1(b) stated that regardless of the type of self-construal which 
individuals primarily identified themselves with (independent self-construal vs. 
interdependent self-construal), participants would self-enhance morally by rating their 
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own moral attributes significantly higher than those of other people.  Both hypotheses 
were tested using paired samples’ t tests.   
As shown in Table 5, participants from both U.S. and Chinese samples tended to 
judge their own moral attributes (M=3.68 and M=3.50 respectively) significantly more 
favorably than those of other people (M=2.47 and M=3.28 respectively, p < .001).  Thus, 
hypothesis 1(a) was supported.   
To test hypothesis 1(b) individuals with strong independent self-construal and 
those with strong interdependent self-construal in each cultural group were identified 
using the method outlined by Balcetis, Dunning, and Miller (2008).  Difference scores 
between independent self-construal and interdependent self-construal were first 
calculated for individual participants.  The participants were categorized as having an 
independent self-construal when the difference scores were greater than zero. When the 
difference scores were lower than zero, the participants were coded as having an 
interdependent self.  When the difference scores were equal to zero, the data was 
excluded from the analysis.  Results showed that more U.S. participants were categorized 
as having an independent self-construal (n=74) than an interdependent self-construal 
(n=53).  In contrast, more Chinese participants were coded as having an interdependent 
self-construal (n=97) than an independent self-construal (n=10).   
Statistically significant differences between rating of self and rating of others 
were observed for participants with different self-construals.  Within the U.S. sample, 
both participants identified as strong independents and strong interdependents tended to 
morally self-enhance, that is to rate themselves significantly more positively (M=3.73 
and M=3.63) than other people (M=2.42 and M=2.53, p < .001).  Similarly, Chinese 
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participants who were interdependent oriented were likely to evaluate themselves 
(M=3.50) significantly more favorably than other people (M=3.27, p < .001).  No 
significant difference was found for Chinese interdependents due to its small sample size 
(n=10).  Therefore, hypothesis 1(b), which stated that individuals’ evaluation of 
themselves will be more favorable than their evaluation of other people independent of 
their primary self-construal, was supported for the most part.   
Table 5 
 
Mean Comparison of Rating of Self and Rating of Others by Cultural Group and Self-
Construal 
Cultural groups Rating of self Rating of others 
     Self-construal M SD M SD 
U.S. 3.68
a
 0.54 2.47 0.51 
    Strong independents (n=74) 3.73
b
 0.53 2.42 0.48 
    Strong interdependents (n=53) 3.63
c
 0.55 2.53 0.54 
China 3.50
d
 0.54 3.28 0.52 
     Strong independents (n=10) 3.51 0.63 3.40 0.53 
    Strong interdependents (n=97)  3.50
e
 0.54 3.27 0.52 
Note.
 a 
For U.S. sample as a whole, means for rating of self and rating of others were 
different at p < .001. 
b
,
 c 
For both independents and interdependents within U.S. sample, 
means for rating of self and rating of others were different at p < .001. 
d
 For Chinese 
sample as a whole, means for rating of self and rating of others were different at p < .001. 
e
 For independents within Chinese sample, means for rating of self and rating of others 
were different at p < .001. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 tested the influence of self-deception on moral self-enhancement, 
while controlling for the influence of gender and cultural group (coded 1 for U.S. and -1 
for China).  Multiple linear regression analysis was used to test this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2(a) stated that self-deception would significantly predict moral self-
enhancement.  Results indicated that the regression model was significant (F (3, 229)= 
53.19, p< .001, R2= .48).  SDE but not IM had a significant positive effect on moral self-
enhancement (β= .24, p< .001).  Participants who experienced high levels of SDE were 
more likely to self-enhance morally compared to those who reported low levels of SDE.  
Thus, hypothesis 2(a) regarding SDE was supported.  In addition, there was a significant 
positive effect associated with one control variable, cultural groups (β= .68, p< .001).  
U.S. participants in general were more likely to demonstrate moral self-enhancement than 
were Chinese participants (Table 6).   
Table 6 
 
Multiple Regression of Self-Deception on Moral Self-Enhancement  
 
 Moral self-enhancement 
 R
2
 F  B SE B β 
 .48 53.19
***
    
SDE   .06 .01 .24
***
 
IM   -.01 .02 -.02 
Cultural Groups   .51 .04 .68
***
 
Gender   -.03 .08 -.02 
Note. 
***
p<.001. 
 
Hypothesis 2(b) tested interaction effect between culture and self-deception on 
moral self-enhancement using multiple linear regression analysis.  Specifically, it was 
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predicted that the effect of SDE on moral self-enhancement would be stronger for U.S. 
participants than for Chinese participants.  Likewise, the hypothesis predicted that the 
influence of IM on moral self-enhancement would be stronger for Chinese participants 
than for their U.S. counterparts.  The interaction terms were produced by multiplying 
SDE and culture as well as IM and country respectively.  The regression model was 
significant (F (3, 227) = 41.17, p< .001, R2= .52).  In addition to the positive effects of 
SDE and culture, the interaction between culture and SDE also exhibited a significant 
positive effect on moral self-enhancement (β= .48, p< .001) (Table 7), suggesting that the 
influence of SDE on moral self-enhancement was greater for U.S. participants than for 
Chinese participants.  The interaction effect of culture and IM was not significant on 
moral self-enhancement.  Therefore, hypothesis 2(b) was partially supported for the 
interaction between SDE and culture but not for the interaction between IM and culture. 
Table 7 
 
Multiple Regression of Self-Deception with Interaction Term on Moral Self-Enhancement  
 Moral self-enhancement 
 R
2
 F  B SE B β 
 .52 41.17
***
    
SDE   .06 .01 .22
***
 
IM   .00 .02 -.001 
Cultural Groups   .29 .08 .38
***
 
SDE x Cultural Groups   .06 .01 .48
***
 
IM x Cultural Groups   -.02 .02 -.15 
Gender   -.03 .08 -.02 
Note. 
***
p<.001. 
 
To visually present the effect of SDE on moral self-enhancement between U.S. 
participants and Chinese participants, the researcher dichotomized SDE using median 
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split and conducted analysis of variance (ANOVA).  The results confirmed the significant 
interaction between SDE and country (F (1, 230)= 13.54, p < .001), indicating that SDE 
had a much more pronounced effect for U.S. participants than for Chinese participants 
(Figure 1).  
Figure 1 
Influence of SDE on Moral Self-Enhancement for U.S. and Chinese Participants 
 
 
Hypotheses 3 & 4 
Hypothesis 3 stated that across two cultural groups, moral self-enhancement is 
greater for individuals with an independent self-construal than those with an 
interdependent self-construal.  Hypothesis 4 stated that across two cultural groups, self-
deception is stronger for independents than for interdependents.  Together, these two 
hypotheses tested the influence of self-construal on moral self-enhancement and self-
deception.  Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to detect differences 
in moral self-enhancement and self-deception between individuals with independent self-
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construal and those with interdependent self-construal.  Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested 
for the U.S. sample and Chinese sample individually and results were reported for each 
cultural group.   
Within the US sample, results of MANOVA showed that self-construal had a 
significant effect on participants’ moral self-enhancement and self-deception (Wilks’ λ= 
.91, F(3, 123)=4.16, p < .01).  Further ANOVA revealed that individuals with 
independent self-construal reported greater discrepancy between rating of self and rating 
of others, i.e., demonstrating stronger moral self-enhancement, than those with 
interdependent self-construal (F(1, 125)=4.38, p < .05).  In addition, independents 
reported marginally higher levels of SDE compared to interdependents, whereas the two 
did not differ significantly on levels of IM (See Table 8 for means and standard 
deviations).  
Table 8 
Means and Standard Deviations for U.S. Participants 
Measures Strong independents Strong interdependents 
 M SD M SD 
Moral self-enhancement 1.31
*
 0.07 1.07 0.09 
SDE 5.74 † 0.35 4.73 0.41 
IM 5.26 0.35 5.98 0.42 
Note. 
*
p<.05. † p<.10.  
 
On similar lines, MANOVA was conducted to test hypotheses 3 and 4 for Chinese 
sample.   Results indicated a significant effect of self-construal on moral self-
enhancement and self-deception (Pillai’s Trace = .055, F(3, 103)=2.73, p < .05).  Given 
the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effect of self-construal on moral 
self-enhancement, SDE and IM were examined individually through ANOVA.  
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Significant univariate main effect for self-construal was only obtained for SDE (F(1, 
105)=4.86, p < .05) (See Table 9 for means and standard deviations).  For Chinese 
participants, interdependents reported experiencing more SDE compared to independents, 
whereas they did not differ significantly in moral self-enhancement or IM.   
Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Chinese participants 
Measures Strong independents Strong interdependents 
 M SD M SD 
Moral self-enhancement 3.51 0.17 3.50 0.06 
SDE 6.12
*
 0.31 3.90 0.96 
IM 4.40 0.81 4.39 0.26 
Note. 
*
p<.05. 
 
Taken together, both hypotheses 3 and 4 were partially supported.  Concerning 
hypothesis 3, self-construal exerted a stronger effect on moral self-enhancement for U.S. 
participants than for Chinese participants.  U.S. participants who were identified as 
having strong independent self-construal exhibited more moral self-enhancement 
compared to their interdependent counterparts.  In contrast, for Chinese participants, 
independents and interdependents did not seem to differ significantly in moral self-
enhancement.  As for hypothesis 4, SDE was significantly greater for independnents in 
the Chinese participants and marginally greater in the U.S. sample.  For both U.S. and 
Chinese participants, independents and interdependents did not differ in their self-
reported levels of IM.  Hence hypothesis 4 was also partially supported. 
Hypothesis 5  
Hypothesis 5 tested the big picture of how self-deception and self-construal 
together influence individuals’ moral self-enhancement.  Separate regression analyses 
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were conducted for U.S. and Chinese participants in an attempt to examine the unique 
predicting power of self-deception and self-construal for the two groups respectively.   
As revealed in Table 10, the regression model for U.S. participants was 
significant (F(4, 126) = 12.77, p < .001).  In line with the initial hypothesis, both SDE 
and independent self-construal were significant predictors of moral self-enhancement.  
IM and interdependent self-construal did not demonstrate significant relationship to 
moral self-enhancement.  The regression model for Chinese participants as shown in 
Table 11was not significant (F (4, 106) = 1.46, p < .22, ns), indicating that there was no 
significant effect of self-deception and self-construal on moral self-enhancement. 
Table 10 
 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses on Moral Self-Enhancement for U.S. 
Participants 
   U.S.  
Variables R
2
 F B SE B β 
 .30 12.77
***
    
IND   .26 .48 .26
**
 
INTER   -.01 .07 -.01 
SDE   .09 .02 .43
***
 
IM   -.01 .02 -.06 
Note. 
**
p<.01. 
***
 p<.001. 
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Table 11 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses on Moral Self-Enhancement for Chinese 
Participants 
   China 
Variables R
2
 F B SE B β 
 .05 1.46    
IND   -.17 .10 -.25 
INTER   .20 .09 .32
*
 
SDE   -.02 .02 -.11 
IM   .022 .02 .11 
Note.  
*
p<.05. 
 
The absence of significant relationships between moral self-enhancement and 
predictor variables (self-deception and self-construal) for Chinese participants as revealed 
in testing hypothesis 5 were consistent with results of correlational analysis.  As noted 
earlier, however, correlational analysis also revealed significant relationships between 
self-construal, self-deception and rating of others as well as between the predictor 
variables and rating of self.  Taking all these findings into consideration, one may ask 
whether the composite score, which was yielded by subtracting raters’ evaluation of 
others from his or her self-ratings, was a good indicator of moral self-enhancement for 
the Chinese sample.  To seek an answer to this question and further decompose the 
relationships between self-construal, self-deception, and moral self-enhancement for 
Chinese participants, additional analyses were conducted.  Rating of self and rating of 
others were entered into regression equations as outcome variables with an attempt to 
examine how self-construal and self-deception affected Chinese participants’ self-
evaluations and their evaluations of others respectively.  
51 
 
The results of the additional regression analyses (Table 12) indicated that 
independent self-construal had a significant positive effect on both Chinese participants’ 
self-evaluation (β =.26, p<.05) and their evaluations of other people (β =.49, p<.001).  
And quite unexpectedly, SDE was also positively associated with participants’ 
evaluations of others (β =.28, p<.05).   
Table 12 
 
Multiple Regression of Self-Deception and Self-Construal on Rating of Self for Chinese 
Participants 
 Rating of self Rating of others 
Variables R
2
 F B SE B β R2 F B SE B β 
IND .30 10.81** .21 .10 .26* .31 11.53** .38 .09 .49** 
INTER   .10 .09 .15   -.09 .08 -.14 
SDE   .03 .02 .18   .05 .02 .28* 
IM   .03 .02 .13   .01 .02 .04 
Note.  
*
p<.05. 
**
p<.001.  
 
While regression analyses revealed significant relationships between independent 
self-construal, SDE and the two components of moral self-enhancement (i.e., self-
evaluation and evaluation of others), it remained unclear how these findings together 
contributed to an understanding of how Chinese participants self-enhance morally.  
Moreover, as discussed earlier in the chapter, while both Chinese and U.S. participants 
tended to evaluate themselves more favorably than others, the former were more likely to 
rate other people favorably than did the latter.  How does this observation help solve the 
puzzle?  In other words, what role did rating of others play in moral self-enhancement for 
Chinese participants?  Therefore, additional analyses were conducted to test whether the 
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potential pathway linking self-construal and self-deception to enhanced moral self-image 
may be via a favorable rating of others.   
The results of the above-described regression analyses showed that independent 
self-construal had significant influences on both rating of self and rating of others, 
whereas SDE had significant effect on rating of others.  Based on these findings, it was 
hypothesized that rating of others has a mediating effect on the relationship between 
participants’ rating of self and SDE.   
Mediation analyses were conducted to explore the hypothesized mediating effect 
following the procedure outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986).  Baron and Kenny (1986) 
proposed a four-step approach to establishing mediation using regression equations: (1) 
conduct a simple regression analysis with predictor (X) predicting criterion variable (Y) 
to establish that there is an effect that may be mediated; (2) conduct a simple regression 
analysis with X predicting hypothesized mediator (M); (3) conduct a simple regression 
analysis with M predicting Y; (4) conduct a multiple regression analysis with X and M 
predicting Y to establish that X no longer affects Y and that M completely mediates the 
relationship between X and Y.  The effects in both steps 3 and 4 are estimated in the 
same equation (Figure 2).  A complete mediation effect is said to have occurred if all four 
of the above-mentioned steps are met.  If the first three steps are met but Step 4 is not, 
then partial mediation is indicated.   
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Figure 2 
Rating of Others as Mediator in the Relationship between Rating of Self and Self-
Deception for Chinese Participants 
 
 
To explore the mediating role of rating of others in the relationship between rating 
of self and SDE for Chinese participants (Table 13), rating of self was first regressed on 
SDE in the first equation and the relationship was significant (β =.41, p<.001).  Next, 
rating of others was regressed on SDE (β =.39, p<.001).  Finally, rating of self was 
regressed on both rating of others and SDE.  Results indicated that both SDE and rating 
of others remained significant (β =.21, p<.05 and β =.52, p<.001respectively), suggesting 
that Chinese participants’ rating of others partially mediated the influence of SDE on 
rating of self.  The significance of this partial mediating effect was tested and confirmed 
by Sobel’s test, yielding a z score of 3.02, p<.01.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 
 
Table 13 
Mediation Analysis of Rating of Self, SDE and Rating of Others for Chinese Participants 
 
 Rating of self 
a
 Rating of others 
b
 Rating of self 
c
 
 B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
SDE .07 .02 .41
***
 .07 .02 .39
***
 .04 .02 .21
*
 
Rating of 
others 
      .54 .09 .52
***
 
Note.  
a 
R
2
= .17, F(1, 105)= 21.45, p<.001 for the first equation. 
b
 R
2
= .15, F(1, 105)= 
19.01, p<.001 for the second equation. 
c 
R
2
= .39, F(1, 105)= 33.85, p<.001 for the third 
equation. 
*
p<.05. 
**
p<.01. 
***
p<.001. 
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Chapter V: DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter presents discussion, implications, and limitations of the current study 
and potential directions for future research.  The first section of the chapter provides an 
analysis of research findings, followed by a discussion of some limitations.  The 
implications for moral education and suggestions for future research are presented in the 
last section. 
This study examines the moral self-enhancement effect, which describes a 
discrepancy between ratings of self and others related to attributions in the moral domain.  
While the data reported in this study are self-report there are several studies using other 
procedures that strongly suggest this discrepancy is caused by an enhancement of self-
attributions.  For example, using an experimental procedure Epley & Dunning (2000) 
determined self-serving assessment to overly favorable views of the self in contrast to 
more accurate judgment of peers (see also Alicke & Govorun, 2005; Alicke et al, 2001; 
Balcetis et al, 2008).  In other words, pervious research, almost entirely in western 
countries, finds that individuals tend to be more or less accurate in their assessments of 
others while inflating or enhancing their own attributions.  Hence the discrepancy is 
referred here and in the literature as a self-enhancement effect or, alternately, a self-
serving bias.   
The Cultural Understanding of Moral Self-Enhancement 
 
As noted earlier, extant literature has documented a claim that self-enhancement 
is a culture-specific effect that only stems from a culture of individualism (Heine et al, 
1999; Heine, 2003, 2005).  It is reasoned that individualistic cultures, which emphasize 
independence, autonomy, and agency, encourage members of these cultures to maintain 
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positive self-concept (Triandis, 1995).  Likewise, independent self-construal, which is 
prevalent in individualistic cultures, defines the self in terms of personal uniqueness and 
separation from others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989).  Thus, it is not 
unreasonable to think a greater emphasis on individual autonomy and agency would be 
associated with an enhancement of rating of self-attributes relative to the rating of others.  
In contrast, collectivistic cultures are associated with the notion of interdependent self-
construal that underscores individuals’ relationships and connectedness to others.  In this 
case, as some have suggested, less individualistic cultures might be less likely to enhance 
their self attributes and so may not show a significant enhancement effect (Heine et al, 
1999; Heine, 2003, 2005).  A strong form of this cultural hypothesis might claim that an 
individualistic worldview accounts completely for the enhancement effect so that in 
collectivistic cultures enhancement effects would disappear.  Lacking any other 
explanation this cultural hypothesis has much to recommend it.  However, there already 
is some empirical evidence that shows an association between a form of self-
enhancement and interdependent self-construal (Sedikides et al, 2003).  Given this 
association, the question also arises as to how to best explain any cultural variations by 
applying both a cultural and evolutionary framework. 
The Evolutionary Understanding of Moral Self-Enhancement 
 
The first goal of the current study was to provide an evolutionary account of 
moral self-enhancement.  An evolutionary understanding would argue that self-
enhancement is a universal motivation that evolves as a psychological adaptation to the 
social environment (Trivers, 1976).  In competition for the benefits of cooperation in our 
social environment, those who are perceived altruistic and cooperative are more likely to 
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be awarded with returned benefits from others (Trivers, 1976).  Self-enhancement thus 
serves the purpose of obtaining the benefits of altruism by allowing people to advertise 
themselves as a better cooperator than the average.  Moreover, self-enhancement helps 
boost individuals’ confidence through unconscious processes creating a self-image that is 
better than is objectively warranted, which in turn increases the chances that they will 
gain more social influence (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).   
Clearly, the results of this study provide support for the evolutionary view of self-
enhancement, showing that moral self-enhancement exists regardless of individuals’ 
cultural background and, importantly, their self-construal.  Specifically, both participants 
from the U.S. and China demonstrated a significant discrepancy between their self-
ratings and their ratings of others.  Moreover, the ratings of self-construal do not support 
the cultural hypothesis as stated above.  While the US sample scored higher on 
independent self-construal and the Chinese higher on interdependent, interdependent self-
construal did not significantly diminish self-enhancement in the collectivist (e.g., Chinese) 
culture.  While the data supported the existence of a strong moral self-enhancement effect 
in both samples, the results also showed the moderating effect of culture on moral self-
enhancement.  In particular, U.S. participants in general were more likely to morally self-
enhance than their Chinese counterparts which supports the claim that an individualistic 
culture may be part of the explanation for an enhancement effect.  Together, these 
findings supported the evolutionary hypotheses regarding the universality of moral self-
enhancement while at the same time provided evidence for the cultural variations in its 
manifestation. 
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To examine moral self-enhancement more closely at an individual level, 
participants were categorized as either having a strong independent self-construal or a 
strong interdependent self-construal.  The hypothesis that moral self-enhancement serves 
a universal need would again be supported if moral self-enhancement is observed in both 
strong independents and strong interdependents.  The findings clearly supported this 
prediction for U.S. participants, i.e., individuals identified as strong independents and 
those identified as strong interdependents both evaluated their own character and sense of 
responsibility more favorably than those of others.   
In contrast, the discrepancy between rating of self and rating of others for Chinese 
participants was observed only in individuals identified as strong interdependents and not 
in individuals identified as strong independents.  The absence of significant findings with 
participants with strong independents might be due to its small sample size (n=10), which 
made it difficult to detect any statistically significant difference.  The observation of 
moral self-enhancement in strong interdependents provides further evidence against the 
claim that the motivation to emphasize personal independence and uniqueness might be 
the primary explanation for self-enhancement.  Rather, could it be that the importance of 
social relationships and sense of interdependence stressed by interdependent self-
construal may also motivate individuals who score high on it to unconsciously see 
themselves as excelling on the traits (e.g., good cooperator) that enable them to better 
adjust to social contexts and fit in one’s group?  While Sedikides et al (2003) provide a 
cultural explanation for a related finding in regard to interdependence and self-
enhancement, could there also be an evolutionary explanation for this cultural variation? 
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Self-Deception and Moral Self-Enhancement 
 
  As discussed above, self-enhancement entails an evolutionary benefit, which 
explains the universal need for this motivation.  However, the self-enhancing process 
does not need to be conscious.  Rather, it would be likely to work more effectively if it is 
unconscious, i.e., individuals are honestly convinced of their inflated moral enhancement.  
A review of recent literature adopting an evolutionary perspective has provided some 
clues on how people would deceive themselves in a self-other comparison by biasing 
their information processing (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).  Older research has even 
identified a range of psychological mechanisms available for individuals to appear moral 
but still serve self-interest (Bandura, 1991).  Therefore, the current research informed by 
evolutionary theory would predict that there would be an association between self-
deception and moral self-enhancement.  
In this study self-deception was examined in two forms: self-deceptive 
enhancement (SDE) and impression management (IM).  SDE depicts the tendency to 
describe one’s positive attributes in an inflated yet honestly held manner (Paulhus & John, 
1998), whereas IM refers to the practice of deliberately distorting self-description to 
maintain a favorable public image, which is often associated with lying and faking (Mick, 
1996).  Overall, SDE rather than IM stood out as a significant predictor of moral self-
enhancement.  Participants who experienced high levels of SDE were more likely to 
exhibit moral self-enhancement compared to those low in SDE, which provides strong 
support for the evolutionary explanation of moral self-enhancement.  This finding is also 
clearly consistent with previous studies regarding the advantage of unconscious self-
deception over conscious distortion of self-image (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).  Since 
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consciously mediated lies can be detected by telltale signs such as nervousness, physical 
indicators, or extra cognitive load, conscious, deliberate distortion of self-description as 
described by impression management may not be a good strategy for self-enhancing 
behavior.  Rather, by unconsciously avoiding the truth, exaggerating the truth, or 
obfuscating the truth, biased information processing allows people to search for and 
present flattering information in a more self-convincing way, which in turn facilitates 
their efforts to convince others of their inflated self-image.  
While the universal aspects of self-deception and moral self-enhancement are 
self-evident, this does not mean there are not also important cultural differences.  Further 
examination of cultural difference revealed that the link between SDE and moral self-
enhancement was stronger for U.S. participants than Chinese participants.  Among U.S. 
participants, those who reported higher levels of self-deception as measured by SDE 
display greater moral self-enhancement compared to their peers who were low in SDE.   
Analysis of the Chinese sample did not reveal any significant correlation between 
the composite scores of moral self-enhancement and either SDE or IM.  At first glance, 
such result seems in contradiction with the argument that self-deception is associated 
with moral self-enhancement.  A review of the data analysis procedure, however, already 
provided clues for a different interpretation of moral self-enhancement among U.S. and 
Chinese participants.  For U.S. participants, moral self-enhancement was achieved 
through direct self-advancement, i.e., they gave significantly more favorable evaluation 
of their own moral self-image than those of others.  The more favorably participants rated 
themselves, the greater the discrepancy between rating of self and rating of others, and 
the more moral self-enhancement was observed.   
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In contrast, the self-enhancing efforts of Chinese participants seemed to involve 
not only inflated self-views but also enhanced judgment of other people under 
comparison.  As noted above, findings of some earlier studies have indicated that both 
individualist and collectivists are roughly accurate in predicting their peers’ behavior 
(Balceits et al, 2008).  And the reason for the relative accuracy in social-judgment was 
that when considering the behavior of others, people in general are more likely to base 
their prediction on objective criterion such as base rate information and thus result in 
more accurate predictions (Epley & Dunning, 2000).  As revealed in this study, however, 
Chinese participants reported significantly higher rating of others than did their U.S. 
counterparts (Table 3).  The correlation analysis also showed positive relationship 
between rating of self and rating of others among Chinese participants, suggesting those 
who had favorable self-views would also be more positive in their judgment of other 
people.  Moreover, SDE was found to be positively related to both rating of self and 
rating of others, but not the composite score.  That is, high levels of SDE are associated 
with more favorable judgment of the self and more favorable judgment of others; low 
levels of SDE are associated with less inflated views of the self and of others.  These 
findings may then provide further support for an evolutionary account of moral self-
enhancement by suggesting that in addition to self-enhancement, there is perhaps an 
effect of other-enhancement in Chinese participants.   
In fact, some researchers have suggested that regard for others is associated with 
distinctive psychological and social concerns for members of collectivistic cultures (Bond 
et al, 2000).  For members of collectivistic cultures such as China, regard for others is 
conceptually related to consideration of protecting other’s “faces” and so it is culturally 
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desirable to communicate positive information about other people (Bond et al, 2000).  In 
addition, since the nature of collectivistic culture encourages its members to restrain self 
rather than to stand out (Heine et al, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991), an explicit 
expression of superiority over others is likely to be negatively perceived across the 
communal dimension of personality (Bond et al, 2000).  While there seems to be the 
conflict between the natural tendency to self-enhance and the motivation to fit in one’s 
social context, such conflict could potentially be resolved through a slight elevation of 
regard for other peoples.  By expressing inflated self-regard while at the same time 
displaying a moderately inflated judgment of others, people are allowed to achieve self-
enhancement without the concern of risking social harmony or losing social acceptance.  
Taking these factors into consideration, it is reasonable to expect that rating of others 
may play an important role in the way Chinese participants morally self-enhance.  The 
results of mediation analysis provide further support by showing that the link between 
self-deception and rating of self was mediated by a favorable rating of others among 
Chinese participants.  These results provide further insight into the mechanism that 
associates SDE with moral self-enhancement, suggesting that Chinese participants’ 
motivation to morally self-enhance while also protecting social harmony and social 
acceptance by displaying their positivity toward others.  Perhaps, the term “moral self-
enhancement” for Chinese participants needs to be redefined to include both 
enhancement of self and others 
Self-Construal, Self-deception and Moral Self-Enhancement 
 
Self-construal was examined to help understand cultural differences in moral self-
enhancement and self-deception at the individual level.  In the current study, within-
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group comparisons revealed different patterns of moral self-enhancement among U.S. 
and Chinese participants.  In the U.S. sample, aligned with the cultural explanation for 
self-enhancement, individuals with strong independent self-construal were significantly 
more likely to self-enhance compared to those with strong interdependent self-construal.  
In contrast, strong independents and strong interdependents in the Chinese sample did not 
seem to differ in their manifestation of moral self-enhancement.  
Researchers examining the cultural variations in the demonstration of self-
deception often associate collectivists with IM (Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Suh, 2002) 
and individualists with SDE (Heine & Lehnman, 1995; Heine et al, 1999; Lalwani et al, 
2006).  The link between collectivists/interdependents and IM did not seem to emerge in 
the current study.  However, the relationship between SDE and strong independents, who 
were more likely to morally self-enhance, was replicated in both U.S. and Chinese 
samples, which is again supportive of the initial evolutionary hypothesis that self-
enhancement is an unconscious process intimately related to self-deception. 
Challenges for Moral Education 
 
Results of the current study demonstrated that people in general tend to fall victim 
to moral self-enhancement and self-deception.  Consistent with extant literature these 
findings suggest that people are to some significant degree self-deceptive about their 
ability to behave morally.  For example, in a previous study participants consistently 
overestimated the likelihood that they would redistribute a reward, donating money, or 
avoiding rude behavior (Balcetis et al, 2008) and those in another study were found to 
actually buy fewer flowers in a charity event than they initially self-predicted (Epley & 
Dunning, 2000).  More extreme findings were revealed in moral hypocrisy research 
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(Batson & Collins, 2011; Batson et al, 1997), in which people made selfish choices while 
at the same time avowing firm belief in fairness.    
On the other hand, there is evidence that moral education can help achieve the 
goal of instilling moral ideals within young people.  Researchers have found that teaching 
moral values and principles increases the likelihood that individuals see a decision as 
moral-concern-laden (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) and helps foster one’s concern for 
others’ interests (Lu & Chang, 2011).  However, such awareness does not necessarily 
lead to alignment of behavior with moral standards.  Rather, the unconscious mechanism 
of self-deception enables people to ease the tension between pursuit of self-interest and 
maintenance of moral self-image and still feel morally good about themselves.  Since 
these findings are so recent, their practical implications will need to be addressed with 
further research.  The challenges will be daunting given the rapid and unconscious 
processing of MSE and SDE.  Therefore, perhaps before instilling commitment to 
genuine moral behavior in young people, moral educators will first need to make students 
aware of their moral limitations and biases and seek ways to help them overcome them.  
Limitations of the Study 
 
There are some limitations to the current study.  First, both U.S. and Chinese 
participants were recruited using convenience sampling method.  As noted earlier, most 
U.S. participants are education majors, whereas Chinese participants have academic 
background exclusively in business management and economics.  Character and sense of 
responsibility may derive different meanings and arouse distinctive emotions in these two 
samples, which may have affected the results.  Second, the relatively modest number of 
participants in the current study has limited the power of statistical analyses and may 
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have contributed to the nonsignificant findings, particularly the absence of clear moral 
self-enhancement effect in strong independents in the Chinese sample.  Third, the self-
report measure has limited effectiveness in capturing individuals’ true feeling about 
themselves.  To take one example, previous research has found that collectivists think of 
themselves more in context-bound social roles and behavior rather than in terms of 
specific traits (Suh, 2002).  Thus, the Chinese participants could actually have 
experienced more moral self-enhancement than appeared in their responses to general-
toned, trait-based survey questions.   
Conclusion 
 
Testing an evolutionary framework, the current study examined moral self-
enhancement in relation to self-deception and self-construal.  As hypothesized, the 
evidence demonstrated that self-enhancement was not a characteristic unique to 
individualistic ideology but rather a universal motivation.  Regardless of their cultural 
background and self-construal, participants tended to morally self-enhance, showing 
great discrepancy between their self-ratings and their ratings of others.  Cultural 
variations were also identified as U.S. participants were more likely to self-enhance 
compared to their Chinese counterparts.  At the individual level, strong independents in 
the U.S. sample were found to demonstrate greater moral self-enhancement than their 
interdependent peers.  The observation of moral self-enhancement in Chinese strong 
interdependents indicated that collectivistic values may also motivate individuals to 
present themselves as excelling on traits that enable them to fulfill their cultural ideal of 
interdependence.  The association between self-deception and moral self-enhancement 
provides additional support for the evolutionary account of moral self-enhancement, as 
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unconscious self-deception can better serve the goal of self-enhancement than conscious 
distortion of self-image.  In addition, among Chinese participants, the link between moral 
self-enhancement and self-deception was found to be mediated through favorable ratings 
of others, indicating a potential other-enhancement effect.  Hence a more accurate term 
for moral self-enhancement for Chinese participants might be simply “moral 
enhancement” that includes enhancement of both self and other. 
This study adds to a growing literature investigating general psychological and 
behavioral patterns from an evolutionary standpoint.  It also helps illuminate the nature of 
a self-enhancing motive in terms of its relation with self-deception and explain the 
cultural variations in the manifestation of moral enhancement.  In addition, the research 
findings will likely have important implications in contemporary practices of moral 
education.  Given that the current study is correlational in nature, future research would 
benefit from experimental design that explores causal relationships between self-
enhancement and self-deception.  Moral self-enhancement or moral enhancement as 
measured in the current study focuses on character and sense of responsibility.  Thus, 
those interested in moral self-enhancement in particular could extend their research 
efforts to studying morality-laden traits or behaviors that might elicit distinctive reactions 
among people of different cultural background.  Age may also play an important role and 
is worth looking into.  Studies that investigate the moral self-representation of young 
children and adolescents will provide important implications for theorists, educational 
practitioners, and all other stakeholders who are determined to promote genuine moral 
development and character building in next generation.  Last but not least, future efforts 
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will be needed to further investigate the mechanism of other-enhancement and its 
significance in the moral self-enhancement of people in collective cultures.  
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APPENDIX A: Moral Self-Enhancement Scale 
 
The following items were developed to assess your moral self-perceptions and 
your perceptions of the morality of other people.  There are no right or wrong answers to 
these questions, and your responses are anonymous, so please be as honest as you can.  
We would like you to first respond to some basic demographic questions.  Please check 
the answers that apply to you.   
 
What is your gender?    ___Female ___Male 
What is your age? ___Under 20     ___ 20-29  ___30-39    ___40-49 ___Over 49 
What is the highest level of education that you have completed?    
___High School Graduate   ___Associate’s Degree ___Bachelor’s Degree     ___Graduate 
Study 
What is your ethnic origin? 
___White or Caucasian  ___ Black or African American  ___Asian or Pacific Islander  
___American Indian or Alaskan Native   ___Other race 
   
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.  
Rate your reaction to each statement by writing a number to the left of each statement showing 
that you:  
 
1 = Disagree Strongly                         
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neutral 
4 = Agree   
5 = Agree Strongly 
 
    1) ____Other people always have a clear awareness of what they’re obligated to do, regardless 
of the situations. 
    2) ____Other people have always made their own decisions even in difficult situations, and 
have taken responsibility for their behavior. 
3) ____ I believe I always act as I should, even in those situations when difficult moral choices 
arise. 
  *4) ____In difficult situations other people’s character is likely to change. 
    5) ____ I will take responsibility for what I do even in difficult situations. 
    6) ____ I think that most people have a reliable character that remains constant in difficult 
situations. 
    7) ____ I believe people always act as they should, even in those situations when difficult 
moral choices arise. 
  *8) ____ My character is likely to change in difficult situations. 
9)____ I always have a clear awareness of what I’m obligated to do, regardless of the situations. 
*10) ____My character is quite easily influenced by the situations I find myself in. 
  11) ____ I have always made my own decisions, even in difficult situations, and have taken 
responsibility for my behavior. 
  12) ____ I consider myself to have a reliable character that remains constant in difficult 
situations. 
  13) ____People will take responsibility for what they do even in difficult situations. 
*14) ____People’s character is quite easily influenced by the situations they find themselves in. 
 
* Items keyed in the negative direction. 
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APPENDIX B: Self-Construal Scale 
 
This scale was developed to measure the strength of independent and 
interdependent self-construals.  Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
with the following statements. Rate your reaction to each statement by writing a number 
to the left of each statement showing that you:  
 
1 = Strongly Disagree  
2 = Disagree 
3 = Slightly Disagree 
4 = Neutral   
      5 = Slightly Agree 
      6 = Agree 
      7 = Strongly Agree 
 
1) ____ My personal identity independent of others, is very important to me. (IN) 
2) ____ Speaking up during a class is not a problem for me. (IN) 
3) ____ Having a lively imagination is important to me. (IN) 
4) ____ If my brother or sister fails, I feel responsible. (INTER) 
5) ____ Even when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an argument. (INTER) 
6) ____ My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me. (INTER) 
7) ____ I should take into consideration my parents’ advice when making education/career 
plans. (INTER) 
8) ____ I would offer my seat in a bus to my professor. (INTER) 
9) ____ I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than 
my own accomplishments. (INTER) 
10) ____ It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group. (INTER) 
11) ____ It is important for me to maintain harmony within my group. (INTER) 
12) ____ Being able to take care of myself is a primary concern for me. (IN) 
13) ____ I respect people who are modest about themselves. (INTER) 
14) ____ I value being in good health above everything. (IN) 
15) ____ I feel comfortable using someone’s first name soon after I meet them, even when 
they are much older than I am. (IN) 
16) ____ I prefer to be direct and forthright when dealing with people I’ve just met. (IN) 
17) ____ I am the same person at home that I am at school. (IN) 
18) ____ I will stay in a group if they need me, even when I’m not happy with the group. 
(INTER) 
19) ____ I act the same way no matter who I am with. (IN) 
20) ____ I am comfortable with being singled out for praise or rewards. (IN) 
21) ____ I will sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of the group I am in. (INTER) 
22) ____ I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact. (INTER) 
23) ____ I enjoy being unique and different from others in many respects. (IN) 
24) ____ I’d rather say “No” directly, than risk being misunderstood. (IN) 
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APPENDIX C: The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
 
This scale was designed to measure the tendency to give socially desirable 
responses.  Please indicate the extent to you think the following statements truly describe 
you. Rate your reaction to each statement by writing a number to the left of each 
statement showing that you:  
 
1 ------------ 2 ------------ 3 ------------ 4 ------------ 5 ------------ 6 ------------ 7 
Not True                                         Somewhat True                                      Very True 
  1) ____ I don’t care to know what other people really think of me. (SDE) 
  2) ____ I never cover up my mistakes. (IM) 
  3) ____ I always know why I like things. (SDE) 
*4) ____ I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. (IM) 
  5) ____ The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. (SDE) 
*6) ____ There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. (IM) 
*7) ____ I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough. (SDE) 
  8) ____ I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught. (IM) 
*9) ____ When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. (SDE) 
*10) ____ I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. (IM) 
*11) ____ It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. (SDE) 
*12) ____ I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him (her). (IM) 
*13) ____ I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do. (SDE) 
  14) ____ I always declare everything at customs. (IM) 
  15) ____ It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. (SDE) 
  16) ____ My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. (SDE) 
*17) ____ I have some pretty awful habits. (IM) 
  18) ____ I don’t gossip about other people’s business. (IM) 
*19) ____ I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. (SDE) 
*20) ____ I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. (IM) 
  21) ____ I never swear. (IM) 
*22) ____ My parents were not always fair when they punished me. (SDE) 
*23) ____ I sometimes tell lies if I have to. (IM) 
*24) ____ I rarely appreciate criticism. (SDE) 
  25) ____ I am a completely rational person. (SDE) 
  26) ____ I am fully in control of my own fate. (SDE) 
*27) ____ I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (IM) 
*28) ____ It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. (SDE) 
  29) ____ I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. (IM) 
  30) ____ I have never dropped litter on the street. (IM) 
  31) ____ Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. (SDE) 
  32) ____ When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. (IM) 
  33) ____ I am very confident of my judgments. (SDE) 
  34) ____ I never regret my decisions. (SDE) 
  35) ____ I never take things that don’t belong to me. (IM) 
*36) ____ I have not always been honest with myself. (SDE) 
*37) ____ I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. (IM) 
*38) ____ I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. (SDE) 
*39) ____ When I was young I sometimes stole things. (IM) 
  40) ____ I never read sexy books or magazines. (IM) 
 *Items keyed in the negative direction. 
 
 
 
